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A Generic TC-Based Method to Find the Weakness in Different Phases
of Masking Schemes
Ming Tang , Yuguang Li, Yanbin Li, Pengbo Wang, Dongyan Zhao, Weigao Chen, and Huanguo Zhang
Abstract: Masking is one of the most commonly used Side-Channel Attack (SCA) countermeasures and is built
on a security framework, such as the ISW framework, and ensures theoretical security through secret sharing.
Unfortunately, the theoretical security cannot guarantee practical security, because several possible weaknesses
may exist in the actual implementation. These weaknesses likely come from the masking schemes or are introduced
by the implementation methods. Finding the possible weakness of the masking scheme is an interesting and
important issue for real applications. In this paper, the possible weaknesses for masking schemes in FieldProgrammable Gate Array (FPGA) design are discussed. It was found that the combinational circuit is the key
to the security of masking schemes. The Toggle Count (TC) method and its extension are utilized to evaluate the
security of masking schemes in the design phase and the implementation phase separately. Comparing different
logic-level simulators for the Xilinx FPGA platform, the behavioral and post-translate simulations are considered
as the analysis method in the design phase, while the post-map and the post-route simulations are used to find
the weakness during the implementation phase. Moreover, a Standard Delay Format (SDF) based improvement
scheme is proposed to significantly increase the effectiveness of the TC model.
Key words: Side-Channel Attack (SCA); toggle count; masking; simulation-based analysis
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Introduction

In the past decade, Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs)
have become a threatening analysis method for
cipher implementations[1–4] . Masking schemes are the
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algorithm-based countermeasure against SCA[5–8] . The
goal of masking schemes is to make the physical power
consumption of a cryptographic device independent of
the intermediate values of the cryptographic algorithm,
which is achieved by randomizing these intermediate
values. Ishai et al.[9] proposed a formal theoretical
framework (known as the ISW framework) and gave
the security proofs for the circuits. Due to the
uncontrolled glitches occurring in the masked circuits,
the implementation of hardware masking faces many
challenges. Most of the existing SCAs concentrate on
the leakage of the register; however, in the practical
cipher chip, the leakage of the combinational circuit
also accounts for a large proportion of the issues.
The existing power analysis against a combinational
circuit can be divided into two types. The first one
is to analyze power consumption from the glitches
occurring in the combinational circuit[10–13] . Starting
in 2005, several papers pointed out that the masking
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schemes can be unsafe in practice in the CMOS design
even though they were provably secure[11, 12] . This
is because a CMOS circuit generates leakage caused
by glitches, that can account for 20%–70% of the
dynamic switching power[13] . A glitch is the critical
component of the switching activity of signals in typical
Register Transfer Level (RTL) circuits[10] . Mangard et
al.[11] theoretically investigated the influence on the
masked CMOS gates from the glitches and conducted
experimental verification based on SPICE simulation.
Another type of analysis involves constructing the
leakage model of the whole combinational logic
circuit[12, 14] . Suzuki et al.[14] investigated the leakage
model for the combinational circuit, and proposed static
and dynamic leakage model for the CMOS device.
Mangard et al.[12] proposed the Toggle Count (TC)
model in 2005, which was applied to the analysis of the
power leakage of combinational circuits. Because of
the leakage caused by glitches, masking circuits can be
successfully attacked with TC models that are derived
from the simulation with glitches based on the backannotated netlist. The original Verilog or netlist file
is necessary. Then through logic simulation, the TC
model is constructed after calculating all transitions
for the whole circuit, which means the TC model
describes the sum of power consumption during a
period of time instead of the instant power consumption.
Moradi et al.[15] proposed an improved TC model which
is called the Enhanced Toggle Count (ETC) model.
The effectiveness of the ETC model was verified by
simulation results, and the comparison of the ETC and
TC models showed an improvement of 16% in the
similarity to an analog simulation result.
Simulation results have determined the effectiveness
of the TC method, and several researchers tried to find
the difference between simulations and physical devices
for Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) power
simulation[16–18] . Most of them focused on improving
the accuracy of the power simulation with Electronic
Design Automation (EDA) tools. However, these
researchers tried to improve the accuracy considering
the reconfiguration overhead, accelerator area,
performance tradeoff, and idle power consumption[18] ,
which were not related to the sensitive data. Therefore,
the existing work about the power simulation cannot be
used to analyze the combinational circuits.
Moradi et al.[19] investigated a software
implementation of the Rotating S-Box Masking (RSM)
scheme and proposed an approach to detect side-
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channel leakages on cryptographic implementations.
The paper shows that a generic verification method for
the masking implementation in practice is necessary.
The authors of this study put the TC method as the
entrance to analyze the leakage of combinational
circuits in the masking designs. Moreover, more
attention was paid to the leakage information from
different simulations and identification of the leakage
information from the design phase and implementation
phase separately.
First, the differences among logic-level simulations
were investigated and the effectiveness of TC models
derived from different simulation levels will be
discussed. Next, the original TC model was classified
into a Non-glitch Toggle Count (NTC) model and
Glitch Toggle Count (GTC) model according to the
existence of glitches. Furthermore, an innovative
evaluation method will be proposed to detect the
leakage from two phases, namely the design phase and
implementation phase of the masking scheme. Finally,
an SDF-based improvement will be proposed that can
significantly increase the effectiveness of the GTC
model.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduces notations, measurement setups,
and the Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) distinguisher
considered throughout the paper. Section 3 introduces
the background of TC models and discusses several
problems with them. Moreover, different levels of
simulation and the characters of corresponding TC
models are clarified in this section. Section 4 introduces
the whole flow of the proposed TC analysis method.
Sections 5 and 6 compare the theoretical effectiveness
of different TC models. In addition, several experiments
with TC models were conducted to evaluate the
leakages of the design phase and implementation phase
separately in the masking scheme. The conclusions are
stated in Section 7.

2

Preliminaries

To make the paper self-contained, this section
introduces notations and provides background
information about the measurement setups considered
throughout the paper. In addition, the CPA distinguisher
that was utilized by the original TC model is introduced.
2.1

Notations

The calligraphic letter, like X , is used to denote finite
sets. The corresponding large letter X is used to denote
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a random variable over X , while the lowercase letter
x is a particular element from X . The variance of
X is denoted by Var .X /. The Pearson correlation
coefficient between X and Y is denoted by X;Y and
measures the linear interdependence between X and
Y . The covariance between X and Y is denoted by
Cov .X; Y /.
2.2

Measurement setups

In the following sections, the SASEBO-GII platform
equipped with a Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA chip[20] , which
is specially designed for research on hardware security,
such as SCA attacks, was used to conduct the practical
experiments.
In all the experiments, the SCA traces were collected
by means of a KEYSIGHT InfiniiVision DSOX3034A
digital oscilloscope at a sampling rate of 2 GHz and a
bandwidth limit of 20 MHz to reduce the environmental
noise.
To construct the TC models, the design was
simulated by using an ISE Simulator (ISIM), which
is a logic simulator on the Xilinx ISE platform. Four
levels of simulations are available in ISIM, including
behavioral simulation, post-translate simulation, postmap simulation, and post-route simulation.
2.3

CPA distinguisher

The proposed TC analysis method is based on the
CPA distinguisher which is utilized by original TC
model[3] . In this case, the method starts by constructing
a leakage model L .X / for the target intermediate
variable X. This model corresponds to the leakages
associated with the different values of X . Then the
estimator calculates the correlation, P .t/;L.X / , between
the physical power consumption collected from the
measurement devices, P .t/, and modeled leakages
from the leakage model (e.g., TC model) L .X / to find
the real leakages.

3
3.1

TC Model
Introduction of TC model

Mangard et al.[12] proposed the TC model in 2005. The
TC model is a type of leakage model that is constructed
on the premise of acquiring the design details about
the combinational circuit, which may need the backannotated netlist file of several parts of the device. In
general, the TC model is constructed after calculating
the number of transitions that occur in the
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combinational circuit and the registers.
The TC model is defined as follows:
m
X
P .t / /
gi .t /

(1)

i D1

where P .t / denotes the physical power consumption
at time sample, t; m denotes the number of internal
signals; and gi .t / is the sum of transitions occurring
in the i -th signal during the period of Œt; t C ", where
" is determined by the delay of the longest path in the
combinational circuit[15] .
In a real-world scenario, the attacker must simulate
the combinational circuit for all possible values. If
the register has an eight-bit width, the attacker has to
simulate the circuit 256  255 times and accumulate
the number of transitions in each simulation separately.
Then the attacker can utilize the TC model to perform a
CPA attack.
3.2

Effectiveness of TC—Correlation between
modeled leakage and physical samples

Studies have found that side-channel leakage
exists in the masked CMOS implementations due
to glitches[12] . Moreover, the glitches occur in
combinational circuits due to the delay of logic
gates. Several factors affect the delay of the logic gates,
such as the size of the combinational circuit and the
temperature of the physical device. Though most of the
glitches occur in sequence, the influence of glitches
on power consumption is added accumulatively and
appears as a peak in power consumption traces[15] .
Mangard et al.[12] utilized this character and proposed
the TC model.
To construct a TC model, the DPA-Contest V2
design[21] was simulated by using the ISIM in Xilinx
ISE platform.
Figure 1a shows the TC model
constructed by behavioral simulation and Fig. 1b shows
the physical power trace. To decrease the noise, they
were averaged with the same intermediate value. Then,
256 averaging traces were acquired where each trace
contained 4000 sample points. Hence, the traces
were represented as a matrix, T, of size 256  4000.
The Pearson correlation coefficient between the TC
model constructed by the behavioral simulation and
each column of a matrix, T, was calculated, and the
result is shown in Fig. 1c. The absolute value of the
correlation begins to reach a maximum when the sample
point approximates to 1220, which is the time when the
signals of the combinational circuit begin to toggle.

c
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Physical power

(a)
S-Box

operation
starts

p
(b)

The TC model was constructed with digital
simulators while the transition power of both registers
and logic gates was assumed to be identical. When
the total number of transitions in the circuit was
counted as simulated dynamic power, the number of
transitions in the combinational circuit was more than
that in the registers. In other words, the modeled
leakage of the combinational circuit accounted for a
larger proportion. Evidently, the effectiveness of the
TC method depends on the difference between the
transitions in the physical device and simulation levels.
In the existing studies of the TC method, there are no
related works about it. Since different simulation levels
will reveal the leakage of the countermeasures, it can
help to understand the reason for the TC leakage in
the physical circuit and propose secure countermeasures
both in the design and implementation phases.
3.4

Signals in combinational circuit
begin to toggle

p
(c)

Fig. 1 (a) TC model derived from behavioral simulation,
(b) SASEBO-GII physical power trace, and (c) correlation
between the TC model and each column of matrix, T.

3.3

Toggle power consumption of combinational
circuit

The toggle power consumption of the combinational
circuit is the core part of TC models. Since the TC
model is derived from simulations, the number of the
transitions is fixed when the input and the design of
the circuit are both fixed. However, the number in the
real circuit can be hardly fixed, because there are many
factors, such as input-output path delay, port delay, the
size of the combinational circuit, and the temperature
of the physical device. All of these affect the number of
transitions. For example, assuming a linear ramp at the
output of the gate, for an input-output path delay, d , and
glitch duration, wi , at the gate input, the glitch duration,
wo , at the output of the gate that influences the number
of glitches can be approximated as follows[22] :
8
ˆ
if wi < d I
< wo D 0;
(2)
wo D 2  .wi d /; if d < wi < 2d I
ˆ
: w Dw;
if wi > 2  d
o
i
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Different levels of simulation

TC models can be derived from different levels of logic
simulation. Both the analog and logic simulations are
used to simulate the power consumption of a digital
circuit, and the result of the analog simulation is more
precise than the logic simulation[23] . Since the TC
model is derived from the logic simulation, the accuracy
of logic simulations is the core problem in this paper.
Logic simulations are based on netlists of the digital
circuit that usually contain back-annotated information
about the propagation delay. Naturally, the precision
of the logic simulation depends on the accuracy of the
back-annotated information[23] .
The ISIM is a logic simulator equipped with the
ISE platform, and four levels of simulations are
available in ISIM, including behavioral simulation,
post-translate simulation, post-map simulation, and
post-route simulation. The original Verilog design is
needed when performing behavioral simulation, and the
netlist file that is generated after the design has been
synthesized and translated is required when performing
the post-translate simulation. Post-map simulation is
available after the netlist has been mapped to the
physical device. After the netlist has been placed
and routed, a post-route simulation is available. In
addition, the input-output path delay is provided when
performing a post-map simulation. The input-output
path delay and the port delay are both provided when
performing the post-route simulation. Theoretically, the
post-route simulation is the most accurate. However,
the accuracies of the last two levels of simulations
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may be decreased due to the effect of noise in the
physical device. The differences among the four levels
of simulations are shown in Table 1.

4

TC Analysis Method

To analyze the leakage of a masking scheme in the
design phase and implementation phase separately,
the TC models can be classified as NTC or
GTC, and the difference is whether to describe
the quantity and distribution of glitches in the
process of simulations. Among the four levels of
simulation, the propagation delay is not provided when
performing the behavioral simulation and post-translate
simulation. Since propagation delay is the necessary
condition to predict glitches, the results of behavioral
and post-translate simulation only contain normal
transitions. However, the propagation delay is provided
when performing post-map and post-route simulations,
and the corresponding simulation results contain both
normal transitions and glitches. In conclusion, the
behavioral and post-translate simulations belong to the
NTC model, while the post-map simulation and postroute simulation belong to the GTC model.
A vulnerable masking scheme may contain leakage
in the design phase or the implementation phase
separately. The leakage in the design phase is caused
by the defect of the original scheme, such as the MASBox scheme[5] , thus the NTC model can be utilized to
investigate the design phase leakage. The leakage in
the implementation phase is caused by the weakness of
the certain method, such as the MOS-Box scheme[6] ,
thus the GTC model can be utilized to investigate
the implementation phase leakage. A masking scheme
without leakage in the design phase may still have
leakage due to a weak implementation.
Before introducing the whole flow of the TC analysis
method, significant definitions utilized throughout the
paper are listed below.
Definition 1 (Leakage) After calculating the
correlation, P .t/;L.X / , between physical power
consumption, P .t /, and modeled leakages (calculated
by leakage models), L .X /, the circuit contains
Table 1
Simulation level
Behavioral
Post-translate
Post-map
Post-route

When to perform
Before synthesizing
After translating
After mapping
After routing

leakages if  > 0 (where  is the correlation
corresponding to the correct key, and 0 is the highest
correlation among all correlations corresponding to
other wrong keys).
Definition 2 (NTC leakage and GTC leakage) If
the leakage is detected by the NTC model (the GTC
model), it belongs to the NTC leakage (the GTC
leakage).
The whole flow of the TC analysis method is as
follows:
(1) Determine whether the design is Simple Logic
Circuit Design (SLCD) or Complex Logic Circuit
Design (CLCD) (by Definition 3 in Section 5.1.1) based
on the Verilog design. Choose the TC model derived
from the behavioral simulation or the post-translate
simulation as the NTC model according to the type of
the design. Then, determine whether the circuit contains
NTC leakage with the NTC model as leakage model.
(2) Choose the TC model derived from the post-route
simulation as the GTC model, then determine whether
the circuit contains GTC leakage with the GTC model
as leakage model.
(3) If the circuit contains NTC leakage and GTC
leakage simultaneously, the masking scheme has
defects in the design phase, and the Verilog design
needs to be modified. If the circuit contains GTC
leakage only, the masking scheme has defects in the
implementation phase, and the implementation method
needs to be modified.

5
5.1

TC Analysis on the Design Phase of
Masking
TC model from non-glitch simulations

Non-glitch simulations include behavioral simulation
and post-translate simulation. The difference between
them is that the post-translate TC model contains extra
normal transitions that come from the logic units that
derived from synthesizing and translating.
Next, the effectiveness of behavioral TC model
and post-translate TC model is compared theoretically.
Variable L t is defined as the modeled leakage derived
from post-translate simulation, Lb and as the modeled

Differences between the four levels of simulation.
File required
Verilog design
Post-translate netlist
Post-map netlist
Post-route netlist

Back-annotated information
None
None
IOpath delay
IOpath and Port delay

Quantity of glitches
None
None
Large
Large
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leakage derived from behavioral simulation, L0t D
L t Lb . The physical power consumption, Pa , contains
P ta and P to . Variable P t a denotes the physical power
consumption derived from the normal transitions of
signals in post-translate netlist, and P t o denotes the
physical power consumption apart from P t a in L t .
Thus, Pa D P ta C P t o , P t a D C  L t , where C is
a constant, Lb and P t o are independent, also, L t and
P to are independent.
The Pearson Correlation Coefficient Lb ;Pa of Lb
and Pa can be calculated as follows:
Cov .Lb ; C  L t C P t o /
Lb ;Pa D p
D
p
Var .Lb / Var .Pa /


Cov Lb ; C  Lb C L0t C P t o
D
p
p
Var .Lb / Var .Pa /

Cov .Lb ; C  Lb / C Cov Lb ; C  L0t
D
p
p
Var .Lb / Var .Pa /

C  Var .Lb / C C  Cov Lb ; L0t
D
p
p
Var .Lb / Var .Pa /
p
p
C  Var .Lb / C C Var .Lb / Var .L0t /Lb L0t
D
p
p
Var .Lb / Var .Pa /
p

p
C
Var .Lb / C Var .L0t /  Lb L0t
D
p
Var .Pa /
q
2
0
C Var .Lb / C 2Cov .Lb ; L0t / C L
0 Var .L t /
b Lt
p
Var .Pa /
(3)
Then, L t ;Pa of L t and Pa can be calculated as
follows:
Cov .L t ; C  L t C P t o /
D
L t ;Pa D p
p
Var .L t / Var .Pa /
Cov .L t ; C  L t /
D
p
p
Var .L t / Var .Pa /
p
p
C  Var .L t /
C  Var .Lb C L0t /
D
D
p
p
Var .Pa /
Var .Pa /
p
C Var .Lb / C 2Cov .Lb ; L0t / C Var .L0t /
(4)
p
Var .Pa /
According to Eqs. (3) and (4), the theoretical relation
between Lb ;Pa and L t ;Pa is determined by Lb L0t that
appears
( in Eq. (3). Thus,
Lb ;Pa < L t ;Pa ; if 0 < Lb ;L0t < 1I
(5)
Lb ;Pa D L t ;Pa ; if Lb ;L0t D 1
According to the latter experiments, Lb L0t has a
direct relationship with a unique feature of the logic
circuit design.

5.1.1
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CLCD vs. SLCD

In the practical Logic Circuit Design (LCD), the
behavioral simulation counts the wire signals, input
signals, and output signals as the unit of transitions[24] .
The post-translate simulation is an extension of the
behavioral simulation. Each signal in the original design
is expressed as a Basic Logic Unit (BLU), and the
number of the input ports of a BLU is limited. If any
signals exist that cannot be expressed with a single
BLU, several BLUs and output signals are needed.
Therefore, when the original design is CLCD, more
BLUs and output signals will be added in the posttranslate simulations.
Definition 3 (CLCD and SLCD) Let BLU .In ; O/
denote a BLU with n-bit input port and one-bit output
port. The y (y 2 Y ) is a variable in the Verilog design
that located after the ASSIGN statement[24] , and Y is
a set that consists of all y’s. y D F0m .xi / D x0 ˝
x1 ˝  ˝xm 1 , ˝ denotes an arbitrary logical operator,
where x and y are both single-bit binary variables. The
definitions of SLCD
( and CLCD are stated as follows:
SLCD; if 8y 2 Y; m 6 nI
LCD D
(6)
CLCD; if 9y 2 Y; m > n
5.1.2

Instances of CLCD and SLCD

In Xilinx Virtex5, the BLU of the combinational circuits
is LUT, the maximum number of the input port of a
LUT is six, so one LUT can perform the computation
over GF.26 /. As shown in Fig. 2a, the design is CLCD
when the number of inputs of an arbitrary signal is more
than 6, the extra signal and the LUT3 are added after
synthesis. However, the extra signal and the LUT3 are

(a) CLCD: y D F08 .xi /

(b) SLCD: y D F06 .xi /

Fig. 2

The synthesis results of a CLCD and an SLCD.
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not added if the design is SLCD, which is shown in
Fig. 2b.
5.1.3

Experiment of TC method in SLCD

This experiment is based on Xilinx Virtex5 FPGA
platform, the CLCD is the AES S-Box while the SLCD
is denoted by a two-level combinational circuit with 8
inputs and 8 outputs.
Four TC models can be acquired from different levels
of simulations, and the value of each TC model is shown
in Fig. 2a. All correlation coefficients between each pair
of the four models are more than 0.98. Therefore, when
performing CPA attacks in SLCD with each TC model,
the results are almost identical. From the result of these
experiments, the correct key can be recovered when the
number of traces reaches 34 000.
From Fig. 3 and the theoretical result in Eq. (5), the
effectiveness of the behavioral TC model and the posttranslate TC model are shown to be identical in SLCD.

v

v

5.1.4

Experiment of TC method in CLCD

The CLCD is expressed by the design of the AES SBox, and the values of different TC models are shown in
Fig. 4. To compare the TC model and the physical trace
more intuitively, a linear transformation was applied to
the TC model. The transformed post-translate TC model
and the physical trace are shown in Fig. 5, where a
negative correlation can be found, and the value of the
correlation is 0:36:
Two CPA attacks were performed to the physical
power consumption trace with two TC models and
the effectiveness of them was compared. Figure 6
contains two traces that correspond to the behavioral
TC model and post-translate TC model. The correct key
was successfully recovered by using the behavioral TC
model and post-translate TC model when the number of
traces reached 2554 and 1672, respectively. From Fig. 4

v

v

v

v

v

v

Fig. 3

The values of four TC models in an SLCD.

Fig. 4 The values of four original TC models in a CLCD
(i.e., AES S-Box).
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v

(a) Post-translate TC

Correct key rank

Fig. 5 Comparison between physical trace and posttranslate TC model.

Post translate TC
attack succeeds
with 1672 traces

Behavioral TC
attack succeeds
with 2554 traces

(b) Post-route TC

Number of traces

Fig. 6 Correct key rank of CPA by using behavioral TC
model and post-translate TC model.

and the theoretical result in Eq. (5), the post-translate
TC model was more effective than the behavioral TC
model in CLCD, which had the same experimental
result.
5.2
5.2.1

Leakage in the design phase
MAS-Box masking scheme

The MAS-Box masking scheme was proposed by
Akkar and Giraud[5] , and it is a first-order multiplicative
masking scheme. Since multipliers with one operand
at zero usually require less power than in all other
cases, the multiplicative masking scheme is vulnerable
to Zero-Value (ZV) model[25] .
5.2.2

Experiment results of the NTC model

In this experiment, 300 000 traces were collected and
each of them contained 4000 points. Because the MASBox scheme was CLCD, the post-translate TC model
was selected to represent the NTC model and the
post-route model represented the GTC model as a
control. The post-translate simulation and the post-route
simulation were performed to analyze the masking
scheme, and the transitions were counted when the
input of the combinational circuit changed from 0 to the
unmasked S-Box input. Furthermore, the correlations
between the physical traces and two TC models were
calculated separately, and are shown in Fig. 7, where
the black trace indicates the correlation of the correct
key. Evidently, both of them had the highest peak in the
black trace.
The leakage that occurred in the design phase will

Fig. 7 Pearson Correlation Coefficient of physical traces
and two TC models for (a) post-translate TC and (b) postroute TC.

last until the implementation phase is finished. Thus,
the leakage can be detected by utilizing the NTC model
and GTC model simultaneously.

6

TC Analysis on the Implementation Phase
of Masking

6.1

TC model from glitch simulations

The glitch simulations include the post-map simulation
and post-route simulation. The post-map simulation is
performed in consideration of the input-output path
delay while the post-route simulation is performed
in consideration of both input-output path delay and
port delay. In the real circuit, the port delay is
widespread and accounts for a significant proportion of
the total delay. The difference between the two Standard
Delay Formats (SDFs)[26] that were used by the postmap simulation and post-route simulation is shown in
Table 2. The port delays of the post-map simulation are
Table 2 SDFs used by the post-map simulation and the postroute simulation.
Post-map
(PORT ... ( 0 )( 0 ))
(PORT ... ( 0 )( 0 ))
(PORT ... ( 0 )( 0 ))
(PORT ... ( 0 )( 0 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 109 )( 109 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 99 )( 99 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 104 )( 104 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 109 )( 109 ))

Post-route
(PORT ... ( 535 )( 535 ))
(PORT ... ( 347 )( 347 ))
(PORT ... ( 676 )( 676 ))
(PORT ... ( 488 )( 488 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 99 )( 99 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 109 )( 109 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 109 )( 109 ))
(IOPATH ... ( 104 )( 104 ))
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all equal to zero while the port delays of the post-route
simulation are constant values that were estimated by
the EDA tool.
Next, the effectiveness of the post-map TC model
and post-route TC model were theoretically compared.
The TC models can be considered as the modeled
leakage. The modeled leakages derived from the postmap simulation and post-route simulation cannot be
totally identical with the physical power consumption
due to glitches. The post-map modeled leakage is Lm D
L t C Lmg , where Lmg is the modeled leakage derived
from glitches of the post-map simulation. The postroute modeled leakage is Lr D L t C Lrg , where Lrg is
the modeled leakage derived from glitches of the postroute simulation. The physical power consumption is
Pa D P ta C P to , P t a D C  L t , where C is a constant.
Variables Lmg and L t are independent, Lrg and L t are
independent, and L t and P t o are independent.
First, Lmg ;P t o and Lrg ;P to can be calculated as
follows:

Cov Lmg ; P t o
Lmg ;P t o D q
(7)
p
Var Lmg Var .P t o /

Cov Lrg ; P t o
Lrg ;P t o D q
(8)
p
Var Lrg Var .P t o /
The routed path length causes the difference of
the propagation delay, and the routed path length
has a uniform distribution. Thus, the variances of
glitches derived from post-map simulation and postroute simulation can be assumed to be


Var Lmg D Var Lrg
(9)
The port delays in the post-map SDF file are all equal
to zero; however, in the physical device, they cannot
be zero. Thus, the quantity and distribution of the
glitches generated from the post-map simulation were
significantly different from the physical device. The
post-route simulation was performed when the design
was placed and routed, so port delays that were used
by the post-route simulation were equal to them in the
physical device regardless of the noise. Moreover, the
quantity and distribution of glitches derived from the
propagation delay were equal to it in physical device
irrespective of the noise. Thus,
Lmg ;P to < Lrg ;P to
(10)
From Eqs. (7)–(10),


Cov Lmg ; P t o < Cov Lrg ; P t o
(11)
where variables Lm ;Pa and Lr ;Pa can be calculated as
follows:
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Lm ;Pa D p

Cov .Lm ; Pa /
D
p
Var .Lm / Var .Pa /


Cov L t C Lmg ; P t a C P t o
D
q
p
Var L t C Lmg Var .Pa /

Cov .L t ; P t a / C Cov Lmg ; P t o
q
p
Var .L t / C Var Lmg Var .Pa /

(12)

Cov .Lr ; Pa /
D
p
Var .Lr / Var .Pa /

Lr ;Pa D p


Cov L t C Lrg ; P t a C P t o
D
q
p
Var L t C Lrg Var .Pa /

Cov .L t ; P t a / C Cov Lrg ; P t o
q
p
Var .L t / C Var Lrg Var .Pa /
From Eq. (9) and Eqs. (11)–(13),
Lm ;Pa < Lr ;Pa

(13)

(14)

Two CPA attacks with different TC models were
performed and the effectiveness of them was compared.
The physical traces of the AES S-Box were acquired in
SASEBO-GII with the sample rate of 2  109 s 1 . The
guessing entropy was utilized to evaluate two attacks
and the results are shown in Fig. 8. The guessing
entropy of post-route TC attack is less than the other.
This means that the post-route TC model was more
effective than the post-map TC model, which had the
same as the theoretical result (Eq. (14)).
6.2

Leakage in the implementation phase

The MOS-Box masking scheme was proposed by
Oswald et al.[6] , and works with combinations of
additive and multiplicative masks. It is secure against
ZV attacks, but the MOS-Box scheme is not secure
against TC attacks due to the glitches. Thus, GTC
models (e.g., the post-route TC model) can be used to
perform CPA attacks successfully.
Mangard et al.[12] utilized the post-route TC model to
successfully attack the MAS-Box masking scheme, and
r

4

Number of traces (×10 )

Fig. 8 Guessing entropy of post-map and post-route TC
attacks.
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they demonstrated that the correct key was recovered
before the number of traces reached 30 000. The
leakage of the MOS-Box scheme is caused by
glitches, and the behavioral simulation and posttranslate simulation are performed without glitches, so
the MOS-Box scheme cannot be successfully attacked
by using NTC models. Thus, the MOS-Box scheme
has no design phase leakage, which is different
from the MAS-Box. However, the weakness in the
implementation phase can be found by GTC models
(e.g., the post-route TC model) due to glitches.
6.3

Improved GTC model based on SDF

Since there is a gap between the simulated propagation
delay and the real delay, the method that utilizes the
GTC model to detect the leakage of the masking
schemes still has issues with accuracy, which may lead
to an incomplete evaluation that misses some leakage.
An improvement scheme for GTC models based on
SDF that can increase the accuracy of GTC models
significantly is therefore proposed. The basic flow of
this method is shown in Fig. 9.
An experiment in S-Box of AES was conducted to
verify the effectiveness of this improved scheme. In
the physical device, the input-output path delay and the
port delay can be impacted by environmental factors.
Since all gates and wires are identical at the chip level,
it can be assumed that environmental factors have the
same impact on the propagation delay. Therefore, the
value of the propagation delay was modified by adding
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a constant, C , in SDF that was used by the post-route
TC model. In the S-Box design used for this study, after
the completion of all steps in Fig. 9, it can be found
that  > 0 if C 2 Œ42; 47 with 50 000 traces, where
 is the correlation corresponding to the correct key,
and 0 is the highest correlation among all correlations
corresponding to 255 wrong keys.
The result is shown in Fig. 10, where the black
trace corresponds to the correlation of the correct key.
Evidently, the TC model with an adjusted SDF was
significantly more effective than the original TC model.
The effectiveness will improve with an increasing
number of traces.

7

Conclusion

Masking is one of the most important countermeasures
against SCA because both the design and
implementation phases may consist of security
weakness. To the best of our knowledge, the existing
analytical methods always challenge the security
of masking schemes separately and in two phases.
Security frameworks are often used to validate the
theoretical security of masking schemes. However,
this cannot guarantee the practical security of all
implementations.
In this paper, a new method based on TC models
was proposed to verify the security of masking schemes
both in the design and implementation phases. By
analyzing the difference among different levels of logic

Verilog Design

Synthesis and
Implementation

Simulation Netlist

SDF

(a) Original TC

Timing Simulation
Adjust PORT delay and
IOPATH delay in SDF

Not recovered
the correct key

Toggle Count Model

Calculate Correlation

Adjusted SDF

Recovered
the correct key

Timing Simulation

Adjusted Toggle Count
Model

Fig. 9

Physical Power
Consumption

The flow of the improved GTC model.

(b) SDF-based improved TC
Fig. 10

Comparison between original TC and improved TC.
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simulation, it was confirmed that NTC models could be
used in the design phase and GTC models could be used
in the implementation phase. Therefore, the weaknesses
found with NTC models indicate the defects of masking
schemes in the design phase, while the weaknesses
found with GTC models correspond to the problem in
the implementation phase. Furthermore, an improved
GTC scheme was proposed, that has a smaller gap
with the real design. It is worth noting that both
models are based on the logic simulation, which has
a distinct advantage in efficiency and can be accepted
as a practical evaluation tool in the design of masking
schemes.
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